...against fictions and other tall tales

Friday, 1 June 2012

Canada: Government deficit shrinks, Household sector deficit soars

Canada's first quarter 2012 National Income and Expenditure Accounts were released today.  Here's a brief summary, courtesy of Statistics Canada:
Real gross domestic product (GDP) rose 0.5% in the first quarter, the same pace as in the previous quarter. Business investment contributed the most to first-quarter GDP growth. Final domestic demand grew 0.3%. On a monthly basis, real GDP by industry edged up 0.1% in March.

As was the case throughout 2011, business investment continued to fuel growth. Business investment in plant and equipment advanced 1.2%, the ninth consecutive quarterly increase. Housing investment expanded 2.9%, well above the previous quarter's pace of 0.8%. Non-farm business inventories increased in the first quarter.

Consumer spending on goods and services, another main contributor to GDP growth in 2011, slowed to 0.2% in the first quarter of 2012, after a 0.7% gain in the previous quarter.

In the first quarter, final domestic demand advanced 0.3%. Growth in final domestic demand has been slowing since the first quarter of 2011. Average quarterly growth in final domestic demand was 0.5% in 2011, following 1.1% in 2010.

While exports have been increasing since the second quarter of 2011, they remain below the level reached in the third quarter of 2008. Exports grew 0.6% in the first quarter of 2012, after gaining 1.7% in the previous quarter.

Imports rose 1.1% in the first quarter, almost double the pace of the fourth quarter of 2011.
Growth of real gross domestic product and final domestic demand, Source: Statistics Canada

Two things. First, although the increase in employment in March and April will surely boost consumer spending in Q2, it's very unlikely that the economy will improve markedly for the remainder of the year.  The current slowdown in the US economy and weak European prospects will likely weigh down on both exports and business investment. Second, additional government cutbacks will continue to remove much needed demand from the economy, weakening both employment and growth.

Finally, one important piece of information that the statistical agency isn't highlighting in its summary is the massive increase in the household sector deficit during the first quarter.  According to today's figures, the household financial deficit (i.e., net borrowing or difference between quarterly sectoral spending minus revenue) increased by over $7B during Q1 ($42.5 to $49.4 B).  This is the highest level since the third quarter of 2008.  As for the public sector financial deficit, it has narrowed by approximately $9B ($66.6 to $55.1 B).

Source: Statistics Canada
In a previous post, I explained that the inverse relationship between the government sectoral balance and household sectoral balance is evidence that the goal of public sector deficit reduction is incompatible with the objective of eliminating the household sector financial deficit, one of the key priorities of the Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mark Carney.  More on this theme in my next post.

Thursday, 17 May 2012

Interview: Raymond Lombra on the US economy and economic policy

The optimism about the US economy that took hold earlier this year is fading.  Consumer confidence fell last week to the lowest level in four months and the US job market is weakening, as evidenced by the higher than expected number of unemployment claims.  And on the stock market front, the month of May has been a disappointment as major US indexes fell back to levels not seen since January.

One economist who did not expect 2012 to be very different from last year is Raymond Lombra, a Professor of Economics at Penn State University and former Fed staff economist.  In an interview last September, Lombra explained to host Peter Schiff that the US economy's "lack of momentum" was set and that there was very little that the US fiscal and monetary authorities could do in the short-term to improve the situation.  Rather, Lombra's take is that the US government should continue to support aggregate demand to ensure the recovery takes hold and focus on promoting long-term growth and stability.

I highlight the views of Lombra for three reasons.  Firstly, there are very few people in the US who know more about the banking system, central bank operations and economic policymaking overall than Lombra.  Secondly, the views expressed by Lombra in the interview are strikingly similar to those of Chairman Bernanke in his February 2, 2012, testimony before the House of Representatives' Committee on the Budget, one of Bernanke's better performances in recent months.  Here is an important excerpt from Bernanke's testimony entitled The Economic Outlook and the Federal Budget Situation:
Even as fiscal policymakers address the urgent issue of fiscal sustainability, they should take care not to unnecessarily impede the current economic recovery. Fortunately, the two goals of achieving long-term fiscal sustainability and avoiding additional fiscal headwinds for the current recovery are fully compatible--indeed, they are mutually reinforcing...[A] more robust recovery will lead to lower deficits and debt in coming years.
The last reason why I'm highlighting this interview is that the exchange between Schiff and Lombra is actually quite interesting.  Although Schiff interrupts Lombra throughout the interview, I thought Lombra did a good job in refuting the radical views of the host.  Lombra covers a lot of ground in his responses and provides some very good insight on economic policy, the state of the US economy and on ways to improve the current economic situation. 

The interview is dated September 22, 2011. Here is also the transcript of the interview:

Peter Schiff: Joining the conversation is Dr. Raymond Lombra. He is a Professor of Economics at Penn State University. He is Associate Dean of Research and College Advancement. He is a former Associate Professor of University of the District of Columbia and George Washington University. He is also a former staff economist at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. He has actually consulted with the US Banking Committee in Congress, the Federal Reserve, the Congressional Budget Office, the US Congress Joint Economic Committee, the IMF, the Senate Banking Committee and the US Treasury. Dr. Lombra, welcome to the show. 

Raymond Lombra: Morning Peter.

PS: So have you consulted with anyone in Congress or at the Fed recently?

RL: Well, I’d say informally with various staffers and I also consult with some Wall Street firms. But just because they talk to us doesn’t mean they follow the advice they get! (laughter)

PS: Ok, so then it’s not your fault if they are not following your advice. They are ignoring it! (laughter)

RL: Yes, but I’m not saying we have the right answers either.

PS: What is your advice? I mean, I just went before Congress last week to testify on what they can do to help the economy, or more importantly, how they can stop hurting it. But what is your advice? What are you telling Congress and the Fed? What should they be doing right now?

RL: Well, I think we need to dial back a little here. We’ve obviously entered the "silly season" – the run up to the next election. And you can ask yourself “what reasonably can be accomplished over the next thirteen months?” And I think a lot less than people are imagining.

PS: Well, I don’t think we should be pursuing monetary and fiscal policy with the goal of an election in mind. Our leaders need to be thinking longer term.

RL: Oh, I agree with that. But we know that – more the Congress and the President, of course, than Ben Bernanke and his colleagues – they certainly are fixed on the next election. As you are suggesting, this is going to lead to bad policy. I mean, the whole idea of setting the Fed they way they were set up was to give it the freedom to act in the best long run interest of the nation even if not in the best short run and political interest of its elected leaders.

PS: But it never seems to do that. It always seems to try to re-elect who the incumbents are. That’s generally how they pursue policy.

RL: I think there have certainly been periods like that. And I don’t know if you want to turn this into a discussion about Ben Bernanke, but I’m sure you’ve talked about the Republican’s letter to him in front of the Federal Open Market Committee. I mean, he’s worried about the economy and the question is “what, if anything, can the Fed do?” Well, I would say that the actions they took yesterday are pretty modest. I think that if we got him hooked up to a lie detector and said “do you really think this alone, these two actions that were announced, are going to make a big difference?”, he would say “probably not”.

PS: Well, I think if we hooked him up to a lie detector, it would probably break due to the excess activity. (laughter) You know, I think he’s going to ultimately give the market what it wants, which is more money from helicopters because this economy is imploding. The problem is that they are trying to resurrect a Frankenstein economy. We have to let the US economy die so that a real one can be born to takes its place. We can’t try to preserve an economy by just spending borrowed money. That’s what the Fed is trying to do and it won’t work. Meanwhile, the banks that were bailed out before are all going to fail. So what’s the Fed going to do? Is the Fed going to let them fail this time?

RL: Well, you’ve covered a lot of ground there. I would say that Ben Bernanke knows more than most people on the globe about both the Great Depression and, I would say, the lost decade in Japan. And I think the common threads he draws from those experiences is that it is worth trying something even if in retrospect they didn’t do much good as opposed to doing nothing. And history is going to have to be the judge about which specific initiatives made a difference. But I do want to go back a little bit because there is a tendency to look at what’s happened in the United States over the last few years as akin to a normal recession. The way we talk to our students about it is the economy catches a cold or maybe even the flu. When to my mind what the economy suffered was more like a stroke and we know that the recovery from stroke can be long and it’s going to take a lot patience and attention to long run therapies. But unfortunately our political system is not very patient.

PS: I think the problem is that every time we actually caught a cold in the past, the way the government cured it was just to cover up the symptoms and let us get sicker. And now we’re so sick from all these prior government stimuluses that this last one is actually the one that’s going to kill us. And that’s why the economy is dying because the government continues to administer the toxic medicine that prevents the free market from healing itself.

RL: Well, I certainly agree that, if we took the stance that policymakers are kind of out of short run remedies, this may be a good thing. The question is whether the longer run adjustments in taxes and expenditures and regulations, in particular, on the fiscal policy side can create a more stable environment for businesses and consumers to make good decisions. And there’s really not much hope that any of that is going to happen in the next fourteen months unless the economy slides a lot more than most consensus forecasters see it at the moment.

PS: Listen, I think we’re in a recession already because I think we’re in a depression. So I don’t think it ever ended and I don’t think it’s going to end. I think it’s going to be with us probably for the balance of this decade because I don’t know that the government is ever going to do the right thing. I think they are going to keep on stimulating and we’re never going to get out of this and we’re just going to dig the hole deeper.

RL: Part of it is maybe instant analysis and the 24/7 discussions and the way politicians can get trapped sometime by saying things that maybe in the more full reflection they don’t really believe. But it seems to me that we’re in an environment where, just to take one example, this discussion about “should we or shouldn’t we raise taxes on the rich”. If we stopped the average person on the street – I’m guessing, I think it’s true – that the President and most of the Democrats understand that the wackiest thing you could do between now and when the economy were to regain its feet would be to raise taxes. But that nuance, it gets to be a discussion about raising taxes now and cutting Social Security benefits and Medicare. That would be crazy. I think what the markets are looking for – and I’m guessing what you’re imagining the economy needs – is a path to a more sustainable fiscal environment. And the path would have to be sensitive to where we’re starting from. The great mistakes that were made in the Depression were that we allowed aggregate demand to contract even as it needed to be boosted. We need to avoid that.

PS: Well, I would disagree with that. I think we’ve had too much demand. We bought things we couldn’t afford. That’s the problem. We need more savings. We need to produce more. But the whole thing on taxes and the problem with our economy is not that the rich aren’t taxed enough. The rich are paying plenty of taxes. But when people object to raising taxes in a recession, they do that because it takes money away from individuals. Well so does government spending. The problem is that when you run a deficit as opposed to raising taxes, this damages the economy even more than the taxes. So if politicians are worried about draining the economy of resources from taxes, they really need to be worried about draining the resources from government spending. So what we really need right now is massive cuts in government spending. That’s the only stimulus that going to help: massive cuts in government spending!

RL: Yeah, I would disagree that that is the route out of this – where we are right now today. I think that over the longer run, there’s no question that government spending is too large. You know, Milton Friedman certainly understood that actually the route to long run prosperity was to cut spending for reasons... (inaudible).

PS: Then, how do you think we get out of this? We run big deficits? Let the government spend a bunch of money? I mean, how does the economy recover?

RL: I don’t know any economist – well, I shouldn’t say that. Most economists, rational economists, believe that we need a lot more fiscal discipline over the longer run than we’ve seen.

PS: But we don’t need any now?

RL: The question is how you get there.

PS: But what about right now? What do we need to do right now? What should the fiscal policy be right now? What should the monetary policy be right now?

RL: I don’t think the Fed could or should do much more than it’s done already. We got plenty of liquidity in the system and a little tick down in interest rates isn’t going to make any difference. As you know, it’s small businesses and consumers that can’t get access to credit for a lot of reasons, including the aftermath of the 2007 recession.

PS: Right, but the last thing we want is more consumer credit because we don’t want more spending on borrowed money. We want that credit available for investment and production. So, that would be a bad thing is consumers got more credit.

RL: Well, consumers are rebuilding their balance sheets and what you’re suggesting is that the government needs to rebuild its.

PS: Absolutely.

RL: And I agree with that over the longer run. But I think cutting aggregate demand right now would be exactly the wrong policy. On the other hand, laying out a path, and I’ve seen a lot of different plans. And certainly the deficit reduction committee – the earlier one and the one that is operating now – understand both the need for a path and the general outline of what it’s going to involve. The question is: “Is the political will there to do it?”

PS: But what you’re suggesting is to make that path more difficult. You’re saying we have to run bigger deficits now so that we can tackle the deficits later. But the bigger we make them now, the more difficult it is and the less likely we’re ever going to tackle them.

RL: Well, I don’t think you asked me what I would do on fiscal policy today.

PS: I did ask you. What would you do?

RL: My first order of business would be to lay out the path to fiscal balance over the next five to ten years. That would be the first thing I would do.

PS: We’re going to have to hold that thought until after the break. But I would like to know what we’re going to do about the deficit this year, next year, right away, not the path of the future because we can’t force Congress to follow that path. What counts is what we actually do right now. Think about that and we’ll be right back.

(Break)

PS: So not about a plan for the future, what do we do right now. What does Congress do for this current fiscal year, if anything to make the economy grow?

RL: Well, I would say “damn little” that they can do to improve the economic performance over the next year. I would say that because a lot of the momentum – or lack thereof – is already set in place, I think that we are going to be given a lot of false hope by some. I would have thought we already learned the lesson that there aren’t really such things as shovel-ready projects. So we’re hearing more about infrastructure – I guess the President today was going to be at some bridge in Kentucky saying that this is what we can fix up. But what we’ve learned is that by the time Congress enacts something until a job gets created is a very long time and it has much smaller impact than were envisioned at the time that the policies were pushed. I think that is not the route forward for the next fourteen months. I think extending the payroll tax cut won’t hurt and could help. But I think the most important thing that Congress can do is get together on a longer run framework for cutting spending and, I think, adjusting tax revenues. We can debate whether it should be closing loopholes and lowering rates but we need to be able to adjust the revenue.

PS: But how do they do anything long term when whatever they pass today is not binding on any future Congress? Whatever they do can be undone.

RL: That’s a really good question and I’ve thought about that. You know, political scientists have looked at whether term limits would make a difference. I remember when I was back in Washington for quite a while the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget rule that was put in place did have some significant impact on retaining spending. And looking back on that kind of approach might make some sense.

PS: It couldn’t have worked too well because we got rid of it. That was part of the problem, right? We got rid of it.

RL: I think it did restrain spending relative to what it otherwise would have been and then it got abandoned so let’s learn from that. This time around the committee that is meeting knows that if some agreement on deficit reduction isn’t made there will be very large cuts to the military. And some of them are not too happy about that. So there may be a lever that’s been uncovered here that helps bring some discipline over and above what rule they agree to. There are institutional arrangements that have to be adjusted here. There isn’t an argument that you’re going to make or that I’m going to make that by itself is going to change the path to fiscal stability.

PS: I think big cuts in military spending would be a good thing. So I just assume let them go through. I don’t think that would jeopardize our security. I think what is jeopardizing our security is all the money we’re wasting on excess military spending, among other things. But here’s the problem. See, if I’m right and the economy never recovers then how are they ever going to deal with these deficits? They are always going to say “we can’t raise taxes in a recession and we can’t cut spending in a recession”. And eventually, interest rates are going to go up because inflation is going to be such a problem that they are not going to able to stay down. And then what do we do? What do we do with all of this debt that is financed with T-bills when interest rates are going up? Is the government going to spend all of its money on interest and nothing on anything else or are we just going to turn the money presses full steam?

RL: Well, I think that’s a little extreme but I’m thinking that’s one of the reasons you recommend people be in precious metals. But I’m not as pessimistic as you are at the moment, I think.

PS: About what? You don’t think interest rates can go up?

RL: Look, as we’re speaking, the Dow is down (inaudible) points...(inaudible)

PS: You don’t think interest rates are even going to go up? No, I’m not talking about today...(inaudible)

RL: It’s floating though. It’s floating every day.

PS: Right, but I’m saying, let’s say over the five to ten years. Do you think interest rates are going to stay at these ridiculously low levels?

RL: No, of course not.

PS: Alright, so what happens when they go up to a normal level? The government can’t afford to service the national debt with normal interest rates, let alone high interest rates.

RL: Well, not if you hold everything constant. But everything else is hardly ever constant.

PS: What do you think is going to happen? Are we going to have enormous economic growth that’s going to make these huge deficits financeable at higher levels of interest?

RL: Not with the current set of policies we have in place.

PS: Right. But we could have higher interest rates. We could certainly have a big pick-up in inflation. What if the Chinese decide to...(inaudible)?

RL: I wouldn’t expect that to happen until aggregate demand strengthens considerably.

PS: What about aggregate demand in China? What if the Chinese come to their senses and let the dollar drop against the RMB and the Chinese currency were to sky-rocket in value and China was to go on a global buying spree?

RL: Well, that would be one thing that didn’t stay equal. We could list all sorts of things which would change the economic outlook and that would certainly be a significant one. And policy would need to be adjusted in light of that. And we’d have to hope and expect the Federal Reserve would extract a lot of the liquidity that’s in the system to deal with the inflation that was beginning to emerge.

PS: You keep focusing on this aggregate demand that we need the government to supply. All that government does supply is inflation. All they do is buy what’s been produced. They don’t increase supply. They just increase demand so prices have to go up, or prices are prevented from falling, which might be something that would help the economy. But just having government spend money isn’t going to grow the economy.

RL: Well, I think it’s a component of aggregate demand. It’s not the only source. We also have the consumer...(inaudible)

PS: But where does the government get the money? I mean, if the government spends it somebody else doesn’t have it.

RL: The consumer is the most important part of the economy, proportionally. The consumer is rebuilding its...(inaudible)

PS: Well, I would disagree because if nothing is produced what is he going to consume? Where is the consumer if there is no producer?

RL: Well, producers will produce when demand picks up.

PS: But there’s always demand. I mean, everybody “wants” things. The question is you have to be able to supply it. You have to be able to create it. There are all sorts of things that I’m sure you would like to have but don’t have because you can’t afford it. It’s not because you don’t have demand. You just don’t have the means.

RL: You’re trying to push me into a debate. This is an old debate: does demand create supply or does supply create demand? And the fact is that markets reflect both supply and demand. So that’s my position. I’m saying that, right now, the economy is operating well below its potential. Firms have less employees. Their plants are more idle than they would be in the face of a pickup in their orders. That’s just going to have to work its way out of the system.

PS: Yes, I think what is preventing them from producing is that they lack the capital. They can’t do it at a low enough price to produce goods that propose can afford.

RL: What capital? Firms are sitting on an enormous amount of funds right now.

PS: Well, funds...but that’s not a factory. Just because they have paper doesn’t mean they have a machine.

RL: Oh, there are very few firms today that will tell you they are not hiring because they don’t have more factories to put them to work in. There are a few but there aren’t many.

PS: But they can’t produce things at a competitive price that people can afford to buy. That is the problem. We have to restructure the economy. Hey, this is an interesting discussion. Maybe we can continue it on another program. Thanks for stopping by.

Saturday, 21 April 2012

A microeconomic perspective on the “loans create deposits” meme

By Joseph Laliberté

A private bank’s “cash and cash equivalent” position as shown on its balance sheet typically includes its deposits with other banks, excess reserves at the central bank and vault cash.  In financial accounting, the cash flow statement illustrates the main elements impacting the cash and cash equivalent position of a business between the beginning and the end of a given period.

Perhaps one of the most fascinating aspect concerning the obsession of mainstream macro economists with banks’ cash and cash equivalent position (excess reserves, in particular) is the near irrelevant status this component has in banking and financial circles.  Below is an extract from a letter of the German Banks Association (Bankenverband) to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) that illustrates perfectly the lack of interest that many have in regard to banks’ cash position:
One of the major objectives of the boards' proposals is to provide information which is relevant to predicting future cash flows.  We agree that the issue of liquidity presents a significant challenge for the banking sector.  Nevertheless, cash flow statements cannot help to assess future liquidity in any way.  No financial analyst, for example, has ever queried any of our member banks about, or given any great consideration to, the cash flow statement.  If the IASB has information pointing in another direction, we would be interested in the details. (emphasis added)
Illustrative of the non-importance of a bank’s cash flow statement is that the very definition of “cash and cash equivalent” used for the purpose of building the cash flow statement appears far from standardized across the banking industry.  Some banks, such as Deutche Bank, divide “cash and cash equivalent” on the asset side of its balance sheet into “cash and due from banks” and “interest-earning deposits with banks”. However, for the purpose of its cash flow statement, Deutche Bank defines “cash and cash equivalent” as “cash and due from banks” PLUS “interest earning deposits with banks” MINUS “term deposits with banks”.  For its part, the French bank Société Générale presents on the asset side of its balance sheet two categories (i.e., “cash, due from central banks” and “due from banks”) while for the purpose of its cash flow statement it defines "cash and cash equivalent" as follows: (“cash, due from central banks” MINUS “due to central banks”) PLUS (“due from banks” MINUS “due to banks”).  Closer to home, ScotiaBank defines “cash and cash equivalent” as “cash and non-interest-bearing deposits with banks”, thereby excluding interest-bearing deposits with banks, while National Bank includes cash and all deposits with financial institutions.  Go figure!  One would assume that banks would find it necessary to settle on a common definition of “cash and cash equivalent”, especially since we are often told by the financial press and many economists that this asset component is so critical in analyzing banks’ capacity to extend loans.

That said, even if all banks would settle on a common definition of “cash and cash equivalent”, this asset category would still say very little about a bank’s liquidity.  The reason for this is that any given bank could have a cash and cash equivalent position of zero and still be considered highly liquid thanks to its holding of cash management bills/T-Bills/government bonds. 

Furthermore, the cash and cash equivalent position says nothing about a bank’s capital ratio, the critical element in determining a bank’s capacity to extend credit.  Banks’ capital is allocated to balance sheet expansion through loan and deposit creation, not banks’ cash or reserve position.  As per the cash flow statement of a deposit-taking institution, net additional loans to customers are considered a use of funds, and net additional deposits from customers are a source of funds.  Therefore, once a loan is granted and the customer’s checking account is marked up by the same amount, the cash and cash equivalent position of the bank is left unchanged.  From a microeconomic banking perspective, loans create their own source of funds, or stated differently, "loans create deposits".  Assets-liabilities duration mismatch (interest rate risk) is of course an important consideration, and this is where the discussion ties in with the central bank’s decision on interest rate.

One last point that deserves to be highlighted is that, although a bank’s "cash and cash equivalent" position generally says nothing about its capital position and, consequently, its regulated lending capability, an increase in this asset item may sometimes reflect improved liquidity.  This was arguably the case with QE1 when the Fed purchased mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by crediting private banks’ reserve account at the Fed.  Moreover, if one assumes that with QE1 the Fed engaged in fiscal policy by overpaying for MBS (relative to their market value), then it could be argued that QE1 may have also helped to improve banks’ capital position as well as their regulated lending capability.

In the case of Canada, a QE1 style program was put in place, but since reserves were “mopped up” with the issuance of Canadian government bonds, there was no impact on banks’ “cash and cash equivalent” position, a situation that led to an improvement in their liquidity position (as it did in the U.S).  As for the matter of bank capital, contrary to the U.S., there was no direct injection of public funds to recapitalize the banking sector in Canada.  However, just like what happened in other jurisdictions, accounting authorities proved accommodative.  Changes to the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook in October 2008 allowed banks to re-classify financial assets from “held-for-trading” to “held-to-maturity” under specific circumstances.  Use of this re-classification put some banks on stronger regulated capital footing than would have been the case otherwise.

The FRB blog invites your comments. Please share your thoughts below.

Monday, 16 April 2012

Canada's fiscal stimulus: an interpretation

In a previous post, I suggested that Canada's fiscal policy response to the last recession consisted of an effective set of counter-cyclical economic measures.  To support this idea, I highlighted the fact that, as a result of these measures, Canada's level of public fixed investment increased to the highest level in three decades (see graph 1, click on graphs to enlarge).  Also, I suggested that this increase in fixed capital expenditures helped to mitigate the recession's effect on the level of employment.

Graph 1: Consolidated government fixed capital, 1961-2011, Source: Statistics Canada

This view appears to have caught on.  In his recent budget plan, Canada's Minister of Finance, Jim Flaherty, links the labour market's performance during the downturn to the federal stimulus put forth by Stephen Harper's Government after the last recession (see here):
Economic developments since the introduction of the stimulus phase of Canada’s Economic Action Plan underscore its success in protecting Canadian jobs through strong support to the domestic economy.  As a result...Canada has posted the strongest growth in employment among G-7 countries...
[G]overnment investments in infrastructure were key to the success of the Economic Action Plan...
The budget plan includes the following graphs to support the Government's case that its stimulus was effective in mitigating the impact of the recession:

Graph 2: Improvement in employment during recovery

Graph 3: Unemployment rate, Canada and United States, 2006-2011

Graph 4: Growth in real per capita disposable income, 2006-2010

In graph 2, we see that the improvement in Canada's rate of unemployment during the recovery was the highest among the G7 economies.  In graph 3, we see that the unemployment rate fared better in Canada than in the US.  In graph 4, we see that disposable income rose faster in Canada than in the other G7 countries during the recovery.

But is the increase in fixed capital expenditures really the result of federal government action?  In my earlier post, I was very careful not to associate the increase in fixed public investment in recent years solely with the policy measures put forth by the federal government.  Rather, I specified that it was the "combined success of the federal and provincial governments' stimulus measures" which contributed to the effectiveness of Canada's response to the recession.  In my view, suggesting otherwise would be misleading given that the data from the National Income and Expenditures Accounts shows that the largest share of fixed public investment in recent years has come from provincial and local governments (see graph 5).

Graph 5: Public fixed capital, all levels of government, 1961-2011, Source: Statistics Canada

That said, it would be equally incorrect to suggest that the federal government had no role to play in the recent increase in fixed public investment given that, in Canada, a large share of the income of provincial governments consists of fiscal transfers from the federal government to provinces.  As shown in graph 6, federal transfers represent an important source of income for provincial governments.  And interestingly enough, in recent years there has been a considerable increase in the amount of federal transfers to provincial governments.

Graph 6: Provincial government income from federal government, 1961-2011, Source: Statistics Canada

Does this suggest that the Harper Government is justified when it claims responsibility for the boost in capital expenditures in recent years?  It's hard to say for sure, but there is a good argument to be made that the Harper Government is partly responsible given this increase in federal transfers to provinces since the Tories took office.

Better yet, another explanation would be to propose that responsibility for the significant increase in public fixed investment in Canada in recent years rests instead with the fact that, between 2004 and 2011, the governments in power at the federal level were all minority governments, during which "concessions" were made to opposition parties on budget-related matters (i.e., in terms of additional program funding and increased federal transfers to provinces) as a way for these governments to remain in power. 

This view appears to be supported by the facts.  As you can see in graph 7, federal transfers to provinces increased significantly starting in 2005 following the election of Paul Martin's minority government.  The increase in federal transfers to provinces is especially noteworthy given that it resulted in the first significant increase in federal transfers to provinces (viewed as a ratio of total federal expenditures) since the early 1970s

Graph 7: Ratio of transfers to provinces/federal expenditures, 1961-2011, Source: Statistics Canada

Recall that, in 2005, the Martin Government required the support of the NDP to pass its budget, and that the "compromise" budget significantly increased the amount of funding for programs under provincial jurisdiction such as social housing and education.  But regardless of the nature of these transfers, this additional source of income increased the amount of financial resources available to provinces, enabling them to undertake increased investments in infrastructure and other fixed capital projects.

Now, the above is a very rough sketch.  A more detailed look at the data is necessary to get a better picture of the fiscal dynamics underlying these figures.  Still, I think it's fair to say that the increase in public fixed capital investment in recent years is not solely the result of the stimulus measures put forth by the federal government during and after the last recession.  Rather, as I wrote in my earlier post, it is more likely because of the combined efforts of the federal and provincial governments.

Reference

Courant, P., E. Gramlich, and D. Rubinfield. "The stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants: Or why money sticks where it hits", Fiscal Federalism and Grants-in-Aid, P. Mieskowski and W. Oakland (ed.), Washington: The Urban Institute, 1979.

Monday, 9 April 2012

Europe! It's not too late to reverse austerity

The following article was written by the author of the Classic Indeed blog.  The article is cross-posted on both blogs.  Readers are invited to post comments on either blogs.

Months ago we outlined the challenges that presented themselves to Italy and Greece, and to Germany, France and the United Kingdom.  We opted against austerity, trusting that the technocratic appointments of Messrs Monti and Papademos could transform governments in Italy and Greece, and enable their respective legislatures to both recommend alternative and optimal public expenditure policies and to restrain policymakers from endorsing imposed fiscal restrictions while constraining budgets any further.

Unfortunately for the global economy and markets, Messrs Monti and Papademos initiatives did the contrary.  They aspired towards the heroic in adhering to a sub-optimal detriment and have now emerged as the scapegoats for political and investment désenchantées.

More ironic is that both men had very little to do with the original debacle.  They were recommended to their nation’s legislatures to clean up a mess.  Instead, as a result of attempting to implement austerity measures, they have generated more anxiety in world markets than expected.

Unfortunately, the recent economic deterioration and rising social tensions within their respective economies has become their responsibility, and the political disenchantment surfacing within the electorate is also their responsibility.  Worse still, the time for apologetics is long past and is now irrelevant.  At jeopardy is their leadership, the credibility they endorse for their visions of the future and the overall well-being of their citizenry.

Mr. Draghi and Mrs. Lagarde have voiced a redemptive message.  Both had professed that the worst was over.  For instance, in a speech on March 26 of this year, Mr. Draghi said the following:
“I would like to take this opportunity to provide you with my assessment of the current situation in the euro area and shed light on recent signs of improvements in the overall outlook.  I would particularly like to draw your attention to the effectiveness of the policy measures implemented by the Eurosystem, the EU institutions and national authorities.  And to remind you of the measures that we all must continue to pursue over the coming months and years with great diligence in order to continue on this path of stabilisation.”
As for Mme Lagarde, on March 18 of this year, the Managing Director of the IMF sought to reassure the audience of the 2012 China Development Forum with the following statement:
“There are signs that strong policy actions—especially in Europe—are making a difference. Financial markets have become a little calmer…”
Yet, Spanish yields are rising, as are those of Italy and Greece, and there is more and more talk of a potential third bailout for Greece although the IMF and the ECB have reassured the investment communities that changes in Greece are being introduced as promptly as possible and will be enacted effectively.

Any remnant stress in markets, according to the institutional duo is a result of the misperception by the interested communities that the consolidations proposed by the ailing economies cannot be achieved.

The emerging doubt on behalf of investment communities and investors in general should not be surprising.  After all, it’s their money and it’s their perception that underscores investment decisions.

One daresay that the investment community saw the collapse of the system much earlier than either the IMF or the ECB, although the leadership of the latter two has been proactive in attempting to stabilize investor sentiment and mitigate between some form of restraint and investment in growth and employment.  Notwithstanding, the reassessment that further bailouts will be necessary is now the swan song of European austerity politics.

Unfortunately, European policymaker perceptions of the bond markets are completely skewed as a result of their own biases.  What is difficult for them to appreciate is that there is no basis left for growth.  Unemployment is up, with Spain leading at 23.6% followed by Greece at 21.0%.  And in those Eurozone countries where unemployment rates are low, many of the employed are part-time workers and, as such, susceptible to labour volatility during these turbulent times.

Moreover, capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector over the last four quarters is dropping across the Eurozone at alarming rates.  Order books are not being filled as quickly as desirable, and their durations and size are shorter than required to support additional investments.  As a result, business investment is stalling as management constrains expenditures and saves its liquidity for dividends in lieu of growth to stabilize share values, foreboding that equity markets react adversely to this dilemma and possibly falter.

What most pundits expected from the emerging markets may not be realized: trusting that BRIC plug the slowdown in Europe, with China leading the way.  Unfortunately, there is no plug.  Most informed observers now mitigate between a slowdown and an ease in aggregate demand, with China’s future growth rates in question.  Projections for the region suggest that China’s growth potential could be in the midst of a major contraction with rates dropping to 7.5% from anticipated 8% and over.

Given the above, the most difficult challenge in domestic politics is for any Government to admit that it followed the wrong track.  There is no shame in being part of a bigger bloc of nations that propound fiscal consolidations even if austerity is showing itself as being the ineffective solution to the Eurozone’s financial crisis, a crisis which is now becoming an economic and political crisis.

It actually takes great courage in admitting that the austerity programs recommended may not work out.  The experiences of other nations in the matter, elicit danger signals that can’t be overlooked.  In such a case, the consolation is that if one’s admission is timely, the Government may come out of an unfortunate situation looking respectful and remarkably diligent.  There is still time for Europe to turn back its political agendas before turning the wrong corner.

The FRB blog invites your comments. Please share your thoughts below.

Thursday, 5 April 2012

Canada's unemployment rate falls to 7.2%

The March edition of Statistics Canada's Labour Force Survey brought some good news today.  Canada's unemployment rate fell 0.2 percentage points in March and is now at 7.2 percent.  The Survey indicates that employment increased by over 80,000, with most of these being full-time positions (approx. 70,000).

From a national standpoint, this is good news, especially considering that the majority of these gains come from the private sector.  Also, it's important to note that there was a positive pick-up in new jobs stemming from the manufacturing sector (approx. 12,000).  Increased private sector job creation is a welcome trend, especially given the upcoming public sector job cuts in the coming months and years.

Notwithstanding this good news, Canada's labour market is still facing some significant challenges ahead.  The rate of government spending is growing at the slowest pace in nearly a decade, and may even turn negative as a result of public sector spending cuts.  Also, consumer spending and credit are slowing significantly, suggesting that overall growth is unlikely to come from households in the near term.  And, finally, with increased exports unlikely to give a boost to Canada's economy in the near-term, it's not at all obvious that today's good news marks the start of a positive and sustainable new trend for the Canadian labour market.

Sunday, 1 April 2012

Music break: FRB anniversary edition

I wish to mention that a few weeks ago was FRB's first anniversary. To mark this occasion, I want to extend my gratitude to readers for their continued support and contribution to this site by dedicating this music break to all FRB readers. I hope it is inspiring.

It's another selection from Miles's '67 Tour. Make sure to check out Williams on drums: "he was a babe at the time", as one of my very first followers once astutely remarked. NOD to you...


Thursday, 29 March 2012

Steve Keen, terminology and the Walras-Schumpeter-Minsky Law

A quick post. Steve Keen believes that aggregate demand is income plus change in debt, and that this demand is spent not just on goods and services but also on buying financial assets.  For Keen, this view of aggregate demand is at the heart of what he calls the Walras-Schumpeter-Minsky Law.

Now, although I find much insight from Keen's work (especially his belief that the main source of struggle in the economy is between financial and industrial capital), I simply do not understand why he has to re-invent terminology this way.  Also, there are problems with looking at aggregate demand in this fashion.  Economist Marc Lavoie expressed caution with Keen's definition of aggregate demand last year in a commentary on the (always relevant) Relentlessly Progressive Economics Blog.  Lavoie summarized his thoughts on Keen's view that aggregate demand is equal to GDP plus the change in credit as follows:
This does not make much sense to me.  There is also a certain amount of double-counting since investment is often financed by credit.  Furthermore, if I get one million dollars in loans to purchase a house, credit goes up by one million; and if the seller of the house puts the proceeds in a bank account, this will have no effect whatsoever on GDP or economic activity. It may only have an impact on the price of houses.
But, for me, the problem with Keen's definition really remains one of terminology. In economics, practitioners should really strive to use commonly used terminology.  If not, then discussions on important policy issues become impossible since the focus tends to get bogged down on unimportant and time-consuming language concerns rather than on the issues that really matter.